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Appellate Review of SLUSA Remands after CAFA
Stephen J. Cowent
As part of an effort to curb the abuse of private securities class
actions, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995' (PSLRA). In response to PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements for federal courts, plaintiffs in securities class actions
shifted gears, filing their claims in state court instead.2 Reacting to
these efforts to dodge the stricter federal standards, Congress passed
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998' (SLUSA).
SLUSA provides that class actions involving "covered" securities are
automatically removable to federal court. A "covered" security is "a
security that satisfies the standards . .. specified in paragraph (1) or
(2) of section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 USC § 77r(b)],"
meaning a security listed on the New York Stock Exchange or another
stock exchange with equivalent listing standards.'
SLUSA allows a federal court to dismiss the removed claims if it
finds the claims to be among those types preempted by the statute.' If
the court finds that the securities at issue are not "covered," or that
the claims are not preempted, the court remands the claims to the
state court.6 In practice, then, litigants fight decisive battles for the
claims' survival in federal court, where the question is whether SLUSA
preempts the claims. If the district court remands to the state court
because it finds that the action's claims are not preempted by SLUSA,
defendants seeking to keep the case in federal court by appealing the
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Causes of Action, 50 Stan L Rev 273, 273 (1998) (discussing the "significant forum shift in class
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district court's remand order' face a statutory restriction on appellate
review. The separate statute governing remands, 28 USC § 1447(d), provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."8
This Term, the Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split that has
emerged over the reviewability of a SLUSA remand order.9 The
stakes for litigants are high. Allowing review gives defendants further
protection from discovery and another chance that a court will dismiss
the claims as preempted. Denying review means the case will proceed
in state court and that discovery will commence.
Of the circuits to consider the question, two have read the statute
restricting appeal of most remands to prevent appellate review of
SLUSA-removed remand order.' ° However, relying on Supreme Court
case law decided after those circuit decisions, the Seventh Circuit has
held that, for a remand order that is issued after the district court determined that removal was appropriate, the district court has subject
matter jurisdiction over whether the claim is preempted by SLUSA."
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, because the district courts have jurisdiction over the preemption decision, the determination itself and a
subsequent remand order are "unaffected by § 1447(d)" and so are reviewable by an appellate court."
7
District courts often grant this order as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
but whether this is the correct description of the order is subject to debate and is critical to resolving the order's appealability.
8
28 USC § 1447(d) (2000).
9 See Kircher v Putnam Funds Trust,403 F3d 478 (7th Cir 2005), cert granted No 05-409
(Jan 6,2006) (available at 2006 US LEXIS 6). For a iecent summary of the circuit split, see generally Thomas F Lamprecht, Note, How Can It Be Wrong When It Feels So Right? Appellate
Review of Remand Orders under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 50 Vill L Rev
305 (2005) (concluding, after a brief statutory analysis, that review is barred).
10 See United Investors Life Insurance Co v Waddell & Reed, Inc, 360 F3d 960,967 (9th Cir
2004) ("Because subsection 1447(d) precludes appellate review of the district court's remand
order, we lack jurisdiction to consider [appellant's] motion to dismiss on the merits."); Spielman
v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 332 F3d 116, 127 (2d Cir 2003) (holding that "reviewability of a remand order based on the perceived lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a case
previously removed under SLUSA's preemption provision is governed by 28 USC §§ 1447(c)
and (d)"); Abada v Charles Schwab & Co, 300 F3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir 2002) (finding that
§ 1447(d)'s "bar on the review of remand orders applies regardless of whether the case was
removed pursuant to the general removal statute or the removal provisions of SLUSA").
11 Kircher v Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F3d 847, 850-51 (7th Cir 2004). In its subsequent
decision on the merits, the Seventh Circuit again rejected the argument that the SLUSA remand
was unreviewable. See Kircher,403 F3d at 480 ("Last year, we held that these remands are appeallable ....
Plaintiffs have asked us to overrule our decision about appellate jurisdiction, but
their arguments are unpersuasive."). See also Green, 279 F3d 590 (holding that, where the remand order is based on the district court's supplemental jurisdiction authority, § 1447(d) does not
bar appeal). Green technically does not split with the Ninth or Second circuits, because the district
court had first determined that the plaintiff's complaint was preempted by SLUSA. Id at 594.
12 Kircher,373F3d at 851.
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This Comment attempts to resolve the circuit split over whether
district court determinations of SLUSA preemption are reviewable at
the appellate level. The Comment considers the impact of an analogous body of law-the Class Action Fairness Act of 200513 (CAFA)on the split. The Comment argues that CAFA reflects clear congressional intent favoring review for statutory schemes that, like SLUSA,
grant federal courts jurisdiction in class action cases. Moreover, CAFA's
treatment of remands suggests that these kinds of remands are what
the Supreme Court has termed "claim-processing" rules rather than
"jurisdictional" rules, and so review is not barred. The Comment further argues that allowing review of SLUSA remands is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, the statutes governing federal jurisdiction,
and the purpose of SLUSA itself.
Part I briefly reviews the history of SLUSA, as well as the relevant rules governing removal, remands, appeals, and federal question
jurisdiction. Part II explores the circuit split that has emerged over the
appealability of SLUSA remands, evaluates the arguments on each side
of the split, and concludes that the Supreme Court's decisions in Kontrick v Ryan 4 and Scarborough v Principi" are not dispositive on the

issue. Part III argues that CAFA provides additional support in favor
of review. The Comment concludes that allowing federal appellate
review will better serve SLUSA's goal of creating uniform standards
in securities class actions and that review will not create a burdensome
increase in federal courts' caseloads nor cause undue delays in state
court litigation.
I. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND LANGUAGE OF SLUSA

Congress passed SLUSA "in order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the objectives" of PSLRA, which had "sought to prevent
abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits."16 In an effort to cut down
on "strike suits"'7 and coercive incentives to settle such suits, PSLRA
heightened pleading requirements in class actions alleging fraud in the
Pub L No 109-2,119 Stat 4 (2005), codified at 28 USC §§ 1,1332,1453,1711-15 (Supp 2005).
540 US 443, 455 (2004) (explaining that "[cllarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions
delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority").
15 541 US 401, 413-14 (2004) (finding that the statute at issue did not describe what
"classes of cases" the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is competent to adjudicate).
SLUSA § 2(1), (5), 112 Stat at 3227.
16
17 A strike suit is an action "often based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance
value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement." Black's Law Dictionary 1475
(West 8th ed 2004).
13

14
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sale of national securities. 8 PSLRA also instituted a mandatory stay of
discovery, to be in effect until a district court could determine whether
the action had legally sufficient claims. ' This helps prevent plaintiffs
from pursuing discovery as a tactic to increase the defendant's incentives to settle.
Congress found that after PSLRA, many class actions "shifted" to
state court,0 allowing plaintiffs to avoid the heightened federal pleading
requirements and to pursue discovery in state court, "prevent[ing]
[PSLRA] from fully achieving its objectives '2 To stop this abuse, Congress passed SLUSA, which "enacts national standards for securities
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits."2
Under SLUSA, defendants may remove "covered" class actions
involving "covered" securities to federal court.23 SLUSA explicitly
bars specific class action suits by "preempting" these claims:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law
of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging ... a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security."
This preemption provision requires that where a district court
finds a covered class action to be based on preempted claims, the district court must dismiss the claims. If the claims are not preempted,
the court must remand to the state court. 6 Whether such a remand
order of a claim removed under SLUSA is appealable is the subject of
this Comment.
A. The Appealability of Remands Generally
At first blush, 28 USC § 1447(d), the federal statute that governs
remands, appears to bar appellate review of SLUSA remands. Typically, when a federal court remands a case to the state court from
which the case was removed-either for lack of subject matter juris15 USC § 78u-4(b).
19 Id § 77z-l(b).
20 SLUSA § 2(2), 112 Stat at 3227.
18

21
22

Id.
Id.

15 USC § 78bb(f)(2). See note 4 and accompanying text.
Id § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
25
Id § 77p(b).
26
Id § 77p(d)(4) (providing that "if the Federal court determines that the action may be
maintained in State court" the court "shall remand such action to such State court").
23

24
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diction or because of a procedural error in removal-the remand order is "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 7 There are, however,
exceptions to this rule.
The Supreme Court has held that "§ 1447(d) must be read in pari
materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds speci-

8
fied in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d)." Section
9
1447(c) remands are for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section
1447(d) does not prevent an appellate court from reviewing a district
court's discretionary, abstention-based remand order, nor does it bar
review of discretionary decisions declining to exercise jurisdiction more
generally." If an appellate court concludes that a district court's order
was discretionary, the appellate court may review the order even if the
district court characterized it as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
Thus, whether an appellate court may review a district court's
SLUSA remand order does not depend on how the district court characterized its decision to remand. If the case was remanded because of a
procedural defect or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court may not review the order, but if the appellate court concludes
the remand order was in any way discretionary, the order is reviewable.
The circuit split over the appealability of SLUSA remand orders has
turned on the circuits' interpretations of whether a remand order
based on a finding of nonpreemption is an order remanding for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, or is an order remanding a case over
which the court once had adjudicatory authority but no longer does.
28 USC § 1447(d). Parties may not seek a writ of mandamus to dodge this rule. See, for
example, In re Benjamin Moore & Co, 318 F3d 626,631 (5th Cir 2002).
28 Things Remembered, Inc v Petrarca,516 US 124, 127 (1995). See also Thermtron Products, Inc v Hermansdorfer,423 US 336,346 (1976) ("[O]nly remand orders issued under § 1447(c)
and invoking the grounds specified therein-that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction -are immune from review under § 1447(d).").
29
28 USC § 1447(c) provides that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."
30
See Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance Co, 517 US 706,712 (1996).
31 See, for example, FirstNational Bank of Pulaski v Curry, 301 F3d 456,460 (6th Cir 2002)
("[A] remand order is reviewable on appeal when the district court concludes that the action was
properly removed but that the court lost subject matter jurisdiction at some point postremoval."); City of Tucson v US West Communications,Inc, 284 F3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir 2002)
("[Ilt is clear that non-jurisdictional, discretionary remands are not barred from appellate review."). See also Long v Bando ManufacturingofAmerica, Inc, 201 F3d 754 (6th Cir 2000) (holding that remand orders are reviewable where the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
but remanded, at its discretion, following dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims).
32 See Abada v Charles Schwab & Co, 300 F3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir 2002) ("We are not
bound by the district court's characterization of its authority for remand.... [I]f we concluded
that the district court's order was the result of an exercise of discretion, we could review it."). See
also Ferrari,Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v Home Insurance Co, 940 F2d 550, 553 (9th Cir 1991)
("A court's characterization of its authority for remand is not binding.").
27
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B.

Federal Question Jurisdiction, Removal, and Preemption
Generally, defendants may remove to federal court any action
filed in state court over which federal courts have original jurisdiction.33 Federal courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States""'federal question jurisdiction-as well as diversity jurisdiction over
cases involving citizens of different states." A case "arises" under fed-

eral law if the plaintiff's original claim facially states a federal claimthat is, the Mottley36 well-pleaded complaint rule."
A defense that raises a federal question is not part of a plaintiff's
original claim, so "a case may not be removed to federal court on the
basis of a federal defense."'" Moreover, a defense that federal law preempts the plaintiff's state law claims is generally insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction.40 However, if a federal statute "completely" preempts state law claims, a claim may be removed to federal
court under federal question jurisdiction.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The Seventh Circuit has split with the Ninth and Second circuits
over whether remand orders in cases originally removed under SLUSA
are reviewable. The Ninth and Second circuits hold that § 1447(d) bars
33

34
35
36

28 USC § 1441 (a).
28 USC § 1331 (2000).
Id § 1332.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co v Mottley, 211 US 149, 152 (1908) ("[A] suit arises

under the Constitution and the laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of
his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.").
37 Caterpillar Inc v Williams, 482 US 386, 392-93 (1987) ("The presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides
that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.").
38
See Rivet v Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 US 470 (1998) (holding that a defense of
preclusion is a defense that does not recast a plaintiff's original complaint and so is not a proper
basis for removal). See also Mottley, 211 US at 152 ("It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges
some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by
some provision of the Constitution of the United States.").
39 Franchise Tax Board of California v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
California,463US 1, 14 (1983).

40 See Caterpillar,482 US at 392-93 ("[Ilt is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption.").
41 See Beneficial National Bank v Anderson, 539 US 1, 8 (2003) ("[A] state claim may be
removed to federal court in only two circumstances-when Congress expressly so provides ... or
when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete preemption."); Avco Corp v Aero Lodge, 390 US 557 (1968) (holding that where a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action, any complaint within the scope of the federal
cause of action arises under federal law, even where the plaintiff does not invoke federal law).
See also Franchise Tax Board,463 US at 24 (discussing Avco's holding).
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appellate review of SLUSA remands, whereas the Seventh Circuit holds

that review is not barred.
The First Approach: Section 1447(d) Bars Review of

A.

SLUSA Remands
41

In Abada v Charles Schwab & Co, Inc, the Ninth Circuit held

that it lacked jurisdiction to review a district court's order remanding
an action in which the defendant, an online securities brokerage firm,
allegedly misrepresented its online trading service. " The Abada court

acknowledged that if the district court's decision was discretionary, the

order would be reviewable,44 but found that the lower court's determination that SLUSA did not completely preempt the plaintiff's state

law claims amounted to a determination that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.4 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision

in Things Remembered, Inc v Petrarca,"6 the Abada court declined to

review the order.
Abada explicitly rejected the claim that the district court, in ordering the remand, was exercising its discretion; instead, the district

court was "reaching a legal conclusion" that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 Moreover, the appellate court rejected the defendant's
argument that the order was reviewable because the district court had

to construe SLUSA to determine whether it had jurisdiction. 9 Finally,
Abada rejected the claim that, because removal and remand were
based on SLUSA's explicit provisions, and because SLUSA did not
explicitly bar appellate review of remand orders, such remand orders

are reviewable.' ° In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit empha-

sized Things Remembered's holding that § 1447(d)'s prohibition of
review applies to remand orders made in suits under the general re42
43
44

45

300 F3d 1112 (9th Cir 2002).
Id at 1114-15.
Idat 1116-17.

Id at 1116.

516 US 124, 127-28 (1995) ("As long as a district court's remand is based on a timely
raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction-the grounds for
remand recognized by § 1447(c)-a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of
the remand order under § 1447(d).").
47
300 F3d at 1116 ("[W]e do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the remand order
because it was founded on the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.").
48
Idat 1117.
49
Id at 1118 ("[W]e do not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a remand order simply
because the district court was required to resolve a novel legal issue in order to determine
whether to remand based on the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.").
Id at 1119 (finding that § 1147(d)'s "bar on the review of remand orders applies regard50
less of whether the case was removed pursuant to the general removal statute or the removal
provisions of SLUSA").
46
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moval statute and those made in cases removed under "any other statutes as well.""1
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this basic position in United Investors Life Insurance Co v Waddell & Reed, Inc.2 United Investors in-

volved claims against an investment advisory firm that had allegedly
procured replacement annuity contracts through deceptive and manipulative practices." The defendant removed the case to federal court,
pursuant to SLUSA, and filed a motion to dismiss."4 The district court
issued a remand order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and
remanding the case to state court." The defendants appealed, and the
Ninth Circuit held that the order was unreviewable.
Because the order did not specify on what grounds the case was
remanded, the United Investors court looked to the "substance" of the
remand order." The court explained that "in order to establish jurisdiction over [the defendant's] motion to dismiss, the district court
would have had to decide [the defendant's] SLUSA pre-emption
claim" in the defendant's favor. 7 Because the district court denied the
motion to dismiss, it must have believed that the claim was not removable and, therefore, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction."
Having determined that the district court remanded the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit echoed its previous holding in Abada and the Second Circuit's holding in Spielman v
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc9 that § 1447(d) precludes

review of such orders. The court acknowledged that if the district court
had "remanded on non-subsection 1447(c) discretionary
grounds, then
''
subsection 1447(d) does not bar appellate review." 0
In Spielman, the Second Circuit also held that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of SLUSA remands:' The Spielman court held that "a remand
order based on a finding that the state law claim evades SLUSA preemp51

Id, quoting Things Remembered, 516 US at 128.
.360 F3d 960, 967 (9th Cir 2004) ("Because subsection 1447(d) precludes appellate review of the district court's remand order, we lack jurisdiction to consider [appellant's] motion to
dismiss on the merits. This would be true even if the district court clearly misapplied SLUSA's
preemption provisions.").
53
Idat962.
54
Id at 962-63.
55 Id.
56
Id at 964. See Executive Software North America, Inc v United States District Court, 24
F3d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir 1994) ("[fln instances of ambiguity, this circuit looks to the substance of
the order to determine whether it was issued pursuant to section 1447(c).") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57
United Investors,360 F3d at 966.
58
Idat965.
59
332 F3d 116,127 (2d Cir 2003).
60 United Investors, 360 F3d at 964.
61
Spielman, 332 F3d af 127.
52
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tion is merely an alternative, and not incorrect, way of stating that the

subject matter jurisdiction under SLUSA is lacking." 62 Under this rule, in
cases like United Investors and Spielman, even when a district court does

not explicitly base its remand order on a finding of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an appellate court may not review the order if it was
based on a finding that SLUSA does not preempt the state court claim&3
Spielman reasoned that "SLUSA's applicability is triggered if and
only if a claim, on its face, falls within SLUSA's preemptive scope," so
that a finding that one of SLUSA's substantive requirements does not
apply actually means that "federal question jurisdiction to proceed
under SLUSA is lacking." The courit also noted that, nonjurisdictional discretionary remands aside, it could find only three statutory

exceptions to § 1447(d)'s bar of appellate review, and that "SLUSA

does not constitute a fourth exception."6 Spielman, echoing Abada, also
rejected the argument that because SLUSA did not expressly prohibit

appellate review of remand orders, Congress must have meant to preserve such review."
The Spielman court also relied heavily on Things Remembered's
holding that § 1447(d) barred review of a remand order in a bank67
ruptcy action. Things Remembered, the Second Circuit reasoned,

stood for the proposition that § 1447(d) barred review of such an order "irrespective of whether the initial removal had taken place under

Section 1441(a), the general removal statute, or Section 1452(a), the
bankruptcy removal statute."' Spielman concluded that "[t]he district
court's finding that SLUSA did not preempt [a state law claim] was
tantamount" to a finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed under SLUSA, and that a remand order, based on that

finding, was not reviewable. 6'

Id. The court noted that such a remand order is not reviewable "even if the district
court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is ill-founded or poorly reasoned." Id.
Id at 128-29. See also Pierpointv Barnes, 94 F3d 813,816 (2d Cir 1996).
63
332 F3d at 126-27.
64
Id at 126. The statutory exceptions include civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28
65
USC § 1443; cases removed under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Pub L No 101-73,103 Stat 183 (1989), codified at 12 USC §§ 209(4)(b)(2), 501(1)(3),
1441(a)(1)(3) (2000); and remands that the FDIC wishes to appeal, 12 USC § 1819(b)(2)(C)
(2000). See Spielman, 332 F3d at 126 n 8. See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
Edward H. Cooper, 14 FederalPractice and Procedure§ 3740 (West 3d ed 1998).
Spielman,332 F3d at 127. See also note 131.
66
67
A bankruptcy court's decision to remand a case is not reviewable. 28 USC § 1452(b) (2000).
Spielman, 332 F3d at 128. See Things Remembered, 516 US at 128.
68
332 F3d at 130.
69
62
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The Second Approach: If Properly Removed, SLUSA Remands
Are Reviewable

In Kircher v Putnam Funds Trust,' the Seventh Circuit split with
the Ninth and Second circuits, holding that a remand order of a case
previously removed under SLUSA was reviewable, notwithstanding
§ 1447(d)." Kircher involved a class action against a mutual fund in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the fund and its investment advisor had
72
reduced the value of the plaintiffs' shares by engaging in misconduct.
The defendant removed the suit under SLUSA and requested that the
case be dismissed under SLUSA's preemption provision. The district
court found that, though the action was a "covered class action," the73
claims were not preempted by SLUSA § 77p(b) preemption provision.
The court therefore granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand'
Acknowledging that in order to review the district court's remand
order it had to "reckon" with § 1447(d), the Seventh Circuit found that
SLUSA's provision requiring remand was "not within § 1447(c) or
equivalent to it." Thus a remand ordered pursuant to § 77p(d)(4) was
not a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for a procedural defect in removal, and so § 1447(d) did not bar appellate review
of such a remand order.
The court found that review of the remand order was not barred
by § 1447(d) even though the district court had explicitly indicated
that it remanded the action "because the Court lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction.' 6 The Seventh Circuit explained that the district
judge's "use of the word 'jurisdiction"' was not necessarily conclusive
in preventing review, because of two recent Supreme Court decisions
clarifying the proper use of the phrase "subject-matter jurisdiction.""
In Kontrick, the Supreme Court explained that courts should use
the word "jurisdictional" only "for prescriptions delineating the classes
of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority."'" A few months

373 F3d 847 (7th Cir 2004).
Id at 850 ("This suit was properly removed.... It follows that the remand is unaffected
by § 1447(d).").
72 Id at 847.
73 Kircher v Putnam Funds Trust, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 10327, *7-9 (SD Ill).
74 Id at *9.
75 Kircher,373 F3d at 848-49.
76
Id at 848. See Kircher,2004 US Dist LEXIS 10327 at *9.
77
Kircher,373 F3d at 849. Kircher's analysis distinctly contrasts with United Investors and
Spielman, where the district courts did not explicitly use the word "jurisdiction" but the appellate
courts found that the remand was nonetheless jurisdictional in substance.
78
540 US at 455.
70

71
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79
later, the Court reaffirmed this statement in Scarborough. Under
these holdings, "jurisdictional" refers only to classes of cases federal
courts are "competent to adjudicate. '
Relying on this distinction, the Kirchercourt reasoned that if a case
had properly been removed under SLUSA in the first place-that is, if
the action was "a covered class action" involving a "covered security" -then the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether SLUSA actually preempted the state law claims. Then,
"[a]fter making the decision required by [SLUSA § 77p(b) preemption provision], the district court had nothing else to do: dismissal and
remand are the only options."1 But taking either option meant only
that the court had done "all that the statute [had] authorize[d]" it to
do; neither dismissal nor remand meant "this court lacks adjudicatory
competence." Instead, dismissal or remand meant "the court has
83
been authorized to do X and having done so should bow out."
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "[t]echnically this opinion creates a conflict among the circuits about appellate review of decisions under SLUSA," but noted that Abada and Spielman had been
decided before Scarborough and Kontrick. At any rate, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned: "Both the second and the ninth circuits were mesmerized by the word 'jurisdiction' and did not see the difference between a case that never should have been removed and a case prop8
erly removed and remanded only when the federal job is done."
Finally, the Kircher court noted that appellate review of decisions
under SLUSA "makes practical sense too" because:
SLUSA means ... that one specific substantive decision in securities litigation must be made by the federal rather than the state
judiciary. Appellate review of decisions under § 77p(b) will pro-

79

541 US at 413-14. See note 15.

80

Id.

81 Kircher,373 F3d at 849-50.The court explained:
Once a court does all that the statute authorizes, there is no adjudicatory competence to do
more. That is not the "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction" that authorizes a remand. Otherwise every federal suit, having been decided on the merits, would be dismissed "for lack of
jurisdiction" because the court's job was finished.
Id at 850. As support for this distinction, the court referred to Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 682-83
(1946) (explaining that cases dismissed "for want of jurisdiction where the alleged ... [federal
claim] ... clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous" are not accurately called jurisdictional dismissals).
82 Kircher.373 F3d at 850.
83

Id.

84 Id at 850-51. The court also explained that "although United Investors came a month
after Kontrick the court did not discuss it." Id at 851.
85

Id.
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mote accurate and consistent implementation of that statute, at
little cost in delay beyond what the authorized removal itself creates. Yet if the remand is deemed non-appealable, then a major
substantive issue in the case will escape review-for SLUSA ensures that only the federal judiciary makes the § 77p(b) decision.... [I]t is now or never for appellate review of the question
whether an action under state law is preempted."
To the Seventh Circuit, promoting uniformity would come at little cost
and would be consistent with SLUSA's removal and remand provisions
as well as the federal laws governing removal, jurisdiction, and remand.
At bottom, the circuits are split over whether a remand under
SLUSA's remand provision is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction-and so subject to § 1447(d) via § 1447(c)-or whether such a
remand is the last act of a federal court exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to SLUSA. The Ninth and Second circuits look to SLUSA's preemption provision to determine whether there was federal question
jurisdiction when the case was originally removed. The Seventh Circuit differs, holding that the very purpose of SLUSA is to grant the
district court jurisdiction to make the preemption decision -thus the
district court had jurisdiction as soon as it determined that the case
was properly removed. To the Ninth and Second circuits, if the district
court determines that SLUSA does not preempt the state law claims,
the court never had federal question jurisdiction to begin with and so
a remand, couched in any language, is for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the Seventh Circuit, if the district court determines that
SLUSA does not preempt the state law claims, the district court has
finished its adjudicatory task as mandated by federal law, and its remand is not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
C.

Evaluating the Two Approaches

To the Ninth and Second circuits, a finding that SLUSA does not
preempt a plaintiff's state law claims means the district court did not
have federal question jurisdiction to begin with. For these circuits, a
district court remand under SLUSA § 77p(d)(4) provision is based on
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because § 1447(d) applies only to remands based on a timely
raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject matter jurisdiction,"' the Ninth and Second circuits
that if the district court
finds that SLUSA does not preempt assume
the state law claims, then the
86 Id at 850. The court also noted that "[i]n the unusual securities class action where expedition is vital, we can accelerate the appeal's disposition." Id.
87 Things Remembered, 516 US at 127-28.
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court never had jurisdiction. But these assumptions are at odds with
SLUSA's express removal provision and the statute's very purpose: to
allow the federal judiciary to make the preemption determination. " In
the normal situation where a defendant hopes to raise a preemption
defense, that defense is affirmative, so a state court can itself evaluate
the preemption claim provided that the claim is not completely preempted by federal law. In that situation, a federal court does not have
jurisdiction to evaluate the preemption claim--the federal court has
jurisdiction only if the plaintiff's original complaint itself raised a federal question."
SLUSA allows defendants to remove the case so that a federal
judge can evaluate the preemption defense, effectively overruling the
well-pleaded complaint rule for securities class actions. Section 77p(c)
mandates that "[a]ny covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section,
shall be removable to the Federal district court."9 To the Ninth and
Second circuits, the words "as set forth in subsection (b)" limit removal
to cases that SLUSA preempts. If the action does not allege fraud in
connection with the sale or purchase of a nationally traded security,9
the case should not have been removed. Another reading of the statute,
however, suggests that the propriety of removal does not rest upon preemption. Under this reading, the purpose of the statute is to grant the
federal judiciary the authority to make the preemption decision, and
removal is "proper" whenever this determination must be made.93
1. Proper removal need not rest on preemption.
One can just as easily read the limiting phrase "as set forth in
subsection (b)" to apply to "covered securities" as to "covered class
actions." If Congress had meant to make the removal provision clearly
mandate the Ninth and Second circuits' conclusion that removal is improper unless the state law claims are not preempted, Congress could
have written the statute to read: "Any covered class action, as set forth
in subsection (b), brought in any State court involving a covered security shall be removable."

89

§§ 77p(c),78bb(f)(2).
See Mottley,211 US at 152. See also Caterpillarv Williams,482 US 386, 392-93 (1987).

90

15 USC § 77p(c).

88 See 15 USC

91 Id.
92 See id § 77p(b).
93 That is, whenever a class action is "covered" and involves a "covered security," the preemp-

tion decision must be made and removal is proper. These two questions are relatively straightforward, whereas the preemption decision itself is the most difficult, and critical, determination.
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Because the statute is ambiguous as to whether the "as set forth"
phrase should be applied to "covered class action" or to "covered security" (or to both), the statute's purpose and congressional intent must
be considered. SLUSA's purpose is to return to federal court the
"number of securities class action lawsuits [that] have shifted from
Federal to State courts" after PSLRA.5 Given this goal, and the goal
of preventing plaintiffs from frustrating the mandatory stay of discovery by filing in state court, reading SLUSA's removal provision to allow removal of covered class actions (followed by a decision as to
whether the state law claims are preempted) makes more sense and is
still very much in keeping with the language of the statute. 9
The Ninth and Second circuits' approach does not view SLUSA
as a mechanism by which federal courts are given jurisdiction over the
substantive decision regarding preemption. Instead, these courts view
SLUSA as a simultaneous removal and preemption inquiry process.
These courts are really examining whether removal was proper based
on federal question jurisdiction: if the original claim is completely preempted by federal law, then the court has subject matter jurisdiction,
but, if the claims were not preempted, the court never had subject
matter jurisdiction. The Ninth and Second circuits' approach, then,
does not put much stock in SLUSA's express purpose of granting the
federal courts the adjudicatory authority to evaluate the preemption
claim outside of the normal restrictions of the well-pleaded complaint
rule and federal question jurisdiction.
2. The implications of Kontrick and Scarborough.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its holding finding a SLUSAbased remand reviewable conflicted with the Second and Ninth circuits'

94 See United States v Hohri, 482 US 64, 71 (1987) ("Because the statute is ambiguous,
congressional intent is particularly relevant to our decision."); Silvers v Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc, 402 F3d 881, 896 (9th Cir 2005) ("[W]here a statute is ambiguous, courts should consult a statute's legislative history to discern Congressional intent.").
95 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Conference Committee, HR Rep
No 105-803,105th Cong, 2d Sess 1,1 (1998).
96
Against this position, it might be argued that congressional intent in passing § 1447(d)
reflects a desire to expedite a trial on the merits and avoid frivolous appeals and delay tactics.
This argument is sound for remands involving areas of law, such as diversity jurisdiction, where
extensive appellate review existed before § 1447(d) was passed, creating a consistent set of guidelines for district courts in making remand decisions. However, as discussed at length in Part III,
Congress has recently suggested that for statutory schemes that are new and have no such body
of law, Congress would "particularly encourage appellate courts to review cases that raise jurisdictional issues likely to arise in future cases." Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S 5, 109th Cong,
1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec H 723,729 (Feb 17,2005) (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). See text
accompanying note 116.
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decisions.9 The Kircher court reasoned that the Ninth and Second circuits "did not see the difference between a case that never should have
been removed and a case properly removed and remanded only when
the federal job is done."" Relying on two relatively recent Supreme
Court decisions (Kontrick and Scarborough),the court concluded that
"normal remands" aside, "[tihat's not how SLUSA works"; "SLUSA
means ... that one specific substantive decision in securities litigation

must be made by the federal rather than the state judiciary.""
Kontrick and Scarborough aid the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that properly removed SLUSA remands are not for lack of subject
matter "jurisdiction," but an examination of the cases suggests that
Kontrick and Scarborough do not resolve the question of whether
such remands are reviewable. Kontrick held that filing deadlines prescribed in certain Bankruptcy Code rules were "claim-processing rules
that do not delineate what cases bankruptcy courts are competent to
adjudicate."' ° To get to this holding, the Supreme Court explained that
"[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions
delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the
persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority.... Scarborough explicitly echoed this distinction, reiterating
the intention to clarify that jurisdiction defines a court's adjudicatory
authority, not a court's claim-processing rules.' 2
But neither Scarborough nor Kontrick explicitly enumerates other
kinds of claim-processing rules as being distinct from prescriptions delineating adjudicatory authority. Both cases deal with filing deadlines,
which are much more clearly placed in the "claim-processing" category
than in a jurisdictional category. Neither case suggests that remands are
closer to claim-processing rules than to the alternative, "jurisdictional
rules." A remand provision can plausibly be viewed in one context as a
rule that gives a court a mechanism to proceed once it has made a substantive decision; in other words, as a claim-processing rule. But in
another context, a remand provision might also plausibly be viewed as
a rule requiring a court to do something or as telling a court when it

Kircher, 373 F3d at 850.
98 Idat 851.
99 Id at 850.
100 540 US at 454.
101 Id at 455.
102 Scarborough, 541 US at 401,413-14.
97
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must give up authority to hear a case; that is, as a rule delineating the
court's adjudicatory authority.' 3
In Kircher, the Seventh Circuit implicitly took SLUSA's removal
and remand provisions to be closer to claim-processing rules than to
rules delineating the classes of cases that fall within the federal courts'
adjudicatory authority. At the same time, the court interpreted SLUSA
as a whole to grant federal courts the power and authority to adjudicate the preemption determination.'" This analogy is plausible because
SLUSA, like all federal laws, operates in the context of clear rules (the
well-pleaded complaint rule and general precedents governing federal
question jurisdiction) that themselves delineate the classes of cases
that fall within the federal judiciary's adjudicatory authority. SLUSA
grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the preemption determination, and also provides claim-processing rules to guide courts
making these decisions.
But because the SLUSA remand provision requires the federal
court to remand if state claims remain, a plausible case can be made
that this rule limits the court's authority to decide the case, making the
remand provision a jurisdictional rule. The Seventh Circuit assumes
this is not the case, but Kontrick and Scarborough do not resolve the
issue beyond clarifying that jurisdiction means adjudicatory authority.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's analysis assumes that (1) cases in which
the district court determined that state law claims were not preempted
were nonetheless properly removed, and (2) SLUSA's removal and
remand provisions were necessarily more like claim-processing rules
than like jurisdictional guidelines. Each of the assumptions is plausible,
but neither is inescapable or necessarily compelled by the language of
the statute. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's analysis, like the Ninth and Second circuits', does not convincingly put the issue to rest. More is needed
to understand what Congress meant SLUSA's remand provision to
serve as-a claim-processing rule or a rule delineating the federal
courts' adjudicatory authority. Ideally, SLUSA's legislative history
would serve as a guide, but that history is silent on the issue of remands.
As argued in Part III, SLUSA remands might be better understood when viewed in light of another, analogous body of law that

103 This subtle but important distinction might simply depend on whether the remand provision is discretionary or mandatory. If the court may order a remand for discretionary purposes,
the remand provision is closer to a mechanism by which the court can achieve this. If the remand
provision mandates that "if the court finds X, the court must remand," the provision clearly
draws at least one line at which the court's adjudicatory authority ends. Neither Ko.ntrick nor
Scarboroughdiscusses or explains how courts should navigate these distinctions.
104 See Kircher, 373 F3d at 850 ("SLUSA means ... that one specific substantive decision in
securities litigation must be made by the federal rather than the state judiciary.").
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more explicitly deals with remands. The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 ' -5(CAFA), enacted with language similar to SLUSA's and for a

purpose very similar to SLUSA's, reflects a congressional preference for
appellate review of remand orders in new statutory schemes in order to
create a clear body of law that will guide district courts.
III. SLUSA IN LIGHT OF CAFA
Given SLUSA's failure to explicitly discuss appellate review of
remands, the circuit split that has developed over such review, and a
lack of legislative history to illuminate the congressional intent behind
the passage of SLUSA, this Part argues that SLUSA's sister legislation, CAFA, helps resolve the issue in favor of review. In passing
CAFA, Congress emphasized that the § 1447(d) bar is best applied
where a settled and coherent body of appellate law exists to guide
district courts in implementing a statutory scheme that deals with important jurisdictional questions. 6 The SLUSA remand controversy is
better understood with this in mind. Moreover, CAFA's use of review
of remand orders indicates that Congress intended rules governing
remands in such statutory schemes to be claim-processing, rather than
jurisdictional, rules.
A. CAFA and Congressional Preference for Review
Congress passed CAFA to deal with what it found were "[a]buses
in class actions [that] undermine the national judicial system, the free
flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction. '1 7 CAFA grants original federal jurisdiction over most multistate,
consumer class actions with $5 million or more in aggregate damages,
thus providing for removal of those cases to federal court. CAFA creates both mandatory... and discretionary ' o9 jurisdiction for the federal
courts,
and also grants diversity jurisdiction when diversity is minimal.110

119 Stat 4.
See 151 Cong Rec H at 729 (cited in note 96) (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). See
also text accompanying note 116.
107 CAFA § 2(a)(2), 119 Stat at 5.
108 28 USC § 1332(d)(2). Mandatory jurisdiction exists where one-third or fewer of the
proposed class members are citizens of the state in which the action was filed. Id § 1332(d)(3). If
more than two-thirds of the proposed class members are citizens of the state in which the actions
were filed, the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction. Id § 1332(d)(4).
109 Id § 1332(d)(3). Courts have discretion to decline to exercise their jurisdiction if greater
than one-third but fewer than two-thirds of proposed class members and "the primary defendants" are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed." Id.
110 Id § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(B).
105
106
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This statutory scheme is the area of existing law most analogous to
SLUSA. In fact, most SLUSA actions-provided that the parties have
met its minimal diversity requirements -would fall under CAFA, were
it not for the fact that CAFA explicitly exempts securities actions from
its scope."' Beyond having parallel purposes, CAFA and SLUSA work
in nearly identical procedural ways. First, each identifies a type of class
action that Congress believes must be considered in federal court in
order to prevent abuse. Each statute provides a mechanism for removal
to federal court and allows that court to decide whether the action
should proceed in the federal forum. (Of course, for SLUSA actions, a
finding that the case "belongs" in federal court means the case will be
dismissed.) Finally, each statute provides a remand mechanism.
Importantly, there is no evidence in the statute or in CAFA's legislative history that securities class actions were exempted in order to
avoid review of remand orders. Rather, CAFA did to multistate consumer class actions what SLUSA had already done to securities class
actions: removed them for federal court consideration."'
The similarity in purpose, structure, procedure, and statutory language that SLUSA and CAFA share are evidence that, where one
statute is ambiguous and the other is explicit, the explicit statute is a
good guide to congressional intent in resolving the ambiguities."'
CAFA expressly provides for appellate review of remand orders.
It allows expedited, discretionary reviews of district court orders remanding (or denying remand of) the removed actions to state court.",
The expedited review provision means that courts of appeals reviewing remands must "complete all action on such appeal[s]" within sixty
days of the date the appeal was filed."' Unlike SLUSA, there is an
explicit legislative record dealing with remands and CAFA. Propo-

111CAFA § 5,119 Stat at 13. See also 151 Cong Rec H at 729 (cited in note 96) (Statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("[CAFA] excludes ...class actions that solely involve claims that relate
to matters of corporate governance arising out of State law. The purpose of this provision is to
avoid disturbing in any way the ... jurisdictional lines already drawn in the securities litigation
class action context by the enactment of [SLUSA]."). Thus, Congress exempted securities actions
from CAFA because SLUSA had already addressed the problem of class action abuse involving
securities, not because securities actions were seen as outside the general purpose of CAFA to
remove multistate actions to federal court. See id.
112 See 151 Cong Rec H at 729 (cited in note 96) (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
113 See, for example, United States v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 310 US 534,.54344 (1940) (interpreting the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 in light of other legislation including: the
Hours of Service Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the statutes governing the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and the subsequently enacted Fair Labor Standards Act). See also, for example, Bob
Jones University v UnitedStates, 461 US 574, 601 (1982) (interpreting a statute governing the taxexempt status of schools in light of a provision denying tax-exempt status to social clubs whose
charters or policies discriminate).
114 28 USC § 1453(c)(1).
115 Id § 1453(c)(2).
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nents of the bill explained why review was explicitly granted, creating
an exception to § 1447(d):
[T]he current prohibition on remand order review was added to
section 1447 after the Federal diversity jurisdictional statutes and
the related removal statutes had been subject to appellate review
for many years and were the subject of considerable appellate
level interpretive law. The Sponsors believe it is important to create a similar body of clear and consistent guidance for district
courts that will be interpreting this legislation and would particularly encourage appellate courts to review cases that raise jurisdictional issues likely to arise in future cases." '
The idea that new bodies of law should be exempted from the

§ 1447(d) bar of appellate review so that appellate courts can create
"clear and consistent guidelines for district courts" applies with equal
force to SLUSA."7 Courts have recognized the problem created by the
absence of guidelines for district courts to use in implementing
SLUSA: "[D]istrict court cases appear to be all over the map on the
issue of what state law claims are preempted by SLUSA. ''"8 Given the
unsettled nature of the law as applied to SLUSA reviews as mani-

fested in the circuit split, this new evidence from Congress suggesting
that the § 1447(d) bar is best applied after there is a settled body of
law to guide district courts should influence appellate courts' SLUSA

remand decisions in favor of review.
Moreover, when Congress passed CAFA, this concept of the need
for appellate guidance was not controversial once it became clear, via
the expediting clauses, that defendants could not use appellate review

as a dilatory tactic. Key supporters came on board only after forging a
compromise that required appellate courts to rule on remand appeals

within sixty days."9 Review itself was not the problem; dilatory review
116

151 Cong Rec H at 729 (cited in note 96) (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (emphasis

added).
117 The Seventh Circuit foreshadowed this argument in favor of appellate review in Kircher,

373 F3d at 850.
118 See, for example, Magyery v TransamericaFinancialAdvisors; Inc,315 F Supp 2d 954, 959
(ND Ind 2004) ("A careful reading of the cases reveals that many of the differences [in the preemption decisions] are based on variations in the facts, but there is a clear split among the courts on the
issue of whether the Plaintiffs' claims must allege 'scienter' for SLUSA preemption to apply.").
119 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S 5, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec S 1157,
1184 (Feb 9,2005) (Statement of Sen. Feingold). Senator Feingold's speech arguing for a limit on
the amount of time district courts could consider a remand motion included an emphasis on the
efforts of Senators Schumer, Dodd, and Landrieu to limit the time for appellate review. Senator
Feingold explained, "This 60-day time limit recognizes that there is a potential for delay that
these newly permitted appeals could cause and that there is a need for courts to resolve quickly
at the appellate level the issue of where a case will be heard." Id (emphasis added).
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was. True, those key CAFA supporters wanted the window for defendants to appeal a remand order to be limited, so that defendants could

not use the appellate system as a way of delaying the litigation and unnecessarily increasing costs to plaintiffs. But appeals of SLUSA remands would not face this problem to the degree that CAFA remand
appeals would without the limited filing window, mainly because CAFA
remand decisions are generally more procedurally complex-as they
are based on different removal defect arguments relating to questions
of mandatory versus discretionary jurisdiction."O Defendants seeking to
delay by appealing CAFA remands would have more issues (not necessarily briefed beforehand) to raise on appeal without the restriction on
timely appeals than would SLUSA defendants, who, because removal
was proper, would be challenging only the preemption question. At any
rate, Congress still favored and passed appellate review of CAFA remands, despite the burdens they might create.'
More important, delays due to appellate review were less objectionable to Congress than delays that might be caused by federal dis-

trict courts slow to rule on the remand issue.'2 Significantly, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking body of the
federal judiciary, directly opposed the idea that delays could be ade-

quately dealt with by limiting the amount of time district courts had in
making their remand decisions."3 Congress and the Judicial Confer120 For an discussion of the complexities that CAFA will bring to bear on appellate review,
see generally Linda S. Mulle nix and Paul D. Rheingold, Impact of Class Action FairnessLaw, NY
L J 5 (Mar 3,2005).
121 One response to this argument is that Congress may have believed CAFA remands
would be more complex than SLUSA remands, and so appellate review was more necessary for
CAFA. There are two reasons, however, to doubt this. First, there is no evidence in CAFA's (or
SLUSA's) legislative history suggesting that this was the case. Second, and perhaps more to the
point, SLUSA remands are likely to deal with complex, substantive preemption issues that
CAFA cases generally do not implicate. That is, CAFA's complexity will often be procedural,
whereas SLUSA's complexity stems from the substantive legal issues that the claims raise.
Though substantively complex, the preemption issue can quickly be reviewed because it will
have already been briefed.
122 See, for example, 151 Cong Rec S at 1184-85 (cited in note 119) (Statement of Sen.
Feingold) ("I strongly support this idea of a time limit for decisions on appeals. But it also highlights another great potential for delay that is caused by this bill.... Unfortunately, some courts
take a great deal of time to decide motions to remand."). Feingold's amendment, which was
defeated, would have required district courts to complete all action on a remand motion within
sixty days or to explain why it has not yet ruled. Id. The amendment would have capped the time
a district court could consider a remand motion at 180 days unless the parties agreed to an extension. Id.
123 See Judicial Conference of the United States, Letter to the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Feb 7, 2005), explaining that "the Judicial Conference opposes the imposition of mandatory time frames for judicial actions." 151 Cong Rec S at 1186 (cited in note 119).
Note that Senator Feingold's proposed amendment, imposing time limits on the resolution of
remand motions, troubled the Judicial Conference and the Senate more than the question of
appellate review of such remand orders. In fact, as noted above, any controversy over appellate
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ence, then, have expressed approval of review of remand orders in this
most recent and most analogous area of law. Moreover, Congress did
so despite the burden review would place on federal appellate courts.
CAFA and its legislative history show that Congress favored appeal with new bodies of law concerning jurisdictional versus claimprocessing rules, and this suggests that review of SLUSA remands is
appropriate, especially given the fact that there appears to be no clear
answer within the statute's text (as the circuit split demonstrates).
Analogies to CAFA, of course, are not dispositive. There is the obvious argument that Congress's explicit consideration and approval of
appellate review for CAFA remands suggests that congressional silence on SLUSA remands means Congress intended § 1447(d) to apply to SLUSA. However, there are several responses to this argument,
beginning with the textual, statutory, and case law arguments dealt
with earlier in this Part, which suggest that congressional silence on
the issue cuts both ways.
Next, Congress dealt with CAFA legislation only shortly after
passing SLUSA, and made it clear that it wanted to deal with one issue of class action abuse at a time. Review of remands was not seen as
a major issue with SLUSA (indeed, the issue is not precisely discussed
in its legislative history), but after courts began implementing SLUSA,
Congress found that it needed to be explicit about the need for appellate review of remand orders.2'
Finally, the fact that Congress did not revisit SLUSA-remand reviews as it enacted CAFA is not necessarily surprising. Adding another measure to an already significant tort reform might well have
been seen as unnecessary, given the priority of passing some form of
legislation (and given that SLUSA had already been seen as a major
step in stopping frivolous litigation, whatever SLUSA's confusions).
Ultimately, support for appellate review of SLUSA remands cannot rest on analogies to CAFA alone, but, as demonstrated by the circuit split and the analysis of case law concerning what "subject matter
jurisdiction" means, there are strong arguments in favor of review.

review was resolved simply by requiring expedited review, suggesting that once the opportunity
for dilatory tactics was minimized, appellate review itself was generally favored. This idea applies
well to SLUSA remands, because parties already will have briefed the substantive issues.
124 There is no explicit indication that Congress believed the need for review of CAFA
remand orders was based on the confusion over SLUSA, and Congress could have slipped a
SLUSA review fix into CAFA if action had been considered urgent. But the fact that CAFA
came only a few years after SLUSA, and that the idea of appellate review of such orders-in
such a similar statutory scheme aimed at dealing with a similar problem of class action abusewas relatively uncontroversial, suggests all the more that congressional silence on SLUSA remands should not be viewed as disapproval of review.
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CAFA adds another, especially because SLUSA itself does not provide much evidence of congressional intent.
Where there are strong statutory bases for allowing review as described earlier in this Part, where Supreme Court decisions suggesting
that the term "jurisdiction" does not cover what district courts do
when they remand properly removed SLUSA cases, and where Congress has recognized the difficulties of this sort of statutory scheme in
favor of review, courts, too, should resolve the appealability controversy over SLUSA remands in favor of review.
CAFA Suggests SLUSA Remands Are Not for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
In light of CAFA, the Seventh Circuit's holding that remand orders
of cases previously removed under SLUSA are reviewable is more consistent with the laws governing appellate review, remands, and federal
jurisdiction. This section highlights the legal justifications for this conclusion, answers counterarguments, and briefly examines background
policy principles that support the analysis that review of SLUSA remand orders is favorable.
B.

1. CAFA and Kontrick and Scarborough.

CAFA indicates that Congress sees remands in this kind of statutory scheme as a mechanism by which appellate courts can develop a
body of law that guides district courts in determining jurisdiction. Kontrick and Scarborough suggest that this sort of rule is best deemed a
"claim-processing" -not a jurisdictional-rule. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking only where a court lacks adjudicatory authority to make
a substantive decision under authority granted to it by a federal statute.
With CAFA in mind, when SLUSA's remand, removal, and preemption
provisions are considered more similar to rules delineating whether a
court has adjudicatory authority than to claim-processing rules, it is evident that a district court's decision to remand a SLUSA action because
state law claims are not preempted is actually a decision that the federal court should step aside because its work is finished, not because the
federal court lacks the authority to make such a decision.
2. SLUSA's remand and removal provisions are
claim-processing rules.
SLUSA's removal provision is a rule that creates a mechanism for
federal courts to do the job Congress authorized them to do. Congress
authorized the federal courts to determine whether a securities class
action is preempted by SLUSA. A defendant's claim that the action is
preempted by SLUSA must arrive at the federal court's doorstep
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somehow, and SLUSA's removal provision, § 77p(c), is a rule that allows*that claim to be processed. Likewise, when a court, as authorized
(and indeed instructed) by Congress, has determined that an action's
state law claims are not preempted by SLUSA, the court must remand
the action. Congress has given the court an explicit rule by which to
process this responsibility: SLUSA's remand provision. CAFA's explicit indication that remands are a tool for courts to use in processing
claims and announcing guiding principles supports this idea.
Thus SLUSA's remand and removal provisions fall under what the
Supreme Court would call claim-processing (not jurisdictional) rules As
such, these rules help a court carry out its statutorily defined adjudicatory
authority, though the rules themselves do not define that authority. Like
CAFA's remand provision, SLUSA's remand provision itself merely tells
the court what to do if it makes a certain decision; in no way does it limit
the court's authority to make that decision. CAFA therefore supports the
notion that SLUSA's remand provision is a claim-processing rule.
3. SLUSA grants the federal judiciary the adjudicatory
authority to make the preemption determination.
SLUSA authorizes the federal judiciary to determine whether a
plaintiff's state law claims in a securities class action are preempted by
the statute: "[I]f the Federal court determines that the action may be
maintained in State court pursuant" to SLUSA § 77p(d), then the
court must remand. ' SLUSA has thus given the federal court the adjudicatory authority to make this substantive decision, and SLUSA's
provisions are the means by which the court can exercise that authority. Removal is entirely proper-indeed necessary-for the federal
court to carry out its appointed task. In cases where removal was
proper, the Supreme Court allows review. '
Measuring the authority that SLUSA grants the district courts
against the authority that the general removal statute grants the district courts drives home this point. As discussed in Part I, the general
removal statute allows removal of any case of which "the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction. 127 That is, the statute is a
15 USC § 77p(d)(4).
See, for example, Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance Co, 517 US 706, 712 (1996) (concluding that a district court's abstention-based remand order was reviewable, "as it [was] not
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal procedure"); Carnegie-Mellon
University v Cohill, 484 US 343, 357 (1988) (reviewing a district court's order remanding a removed case involving pendent claims upon a determination that retaining jurisdiction would be
inappropriate). See also In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co,964 F2d 706 (7th Cir 1992) (holding that cases remanded on non-§ 1447(c) grounds are subject to review).
127 28 USC § 1441 (a). See text accompanying note 33.
125

126
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claim-processing rule that provides courts with a mechanism by which
to hear a case over which they have jurisdiction (adjudicatory authority).
Under the general removal statute, a court can exercise jurisdiction over any case that would have fallen under its adjudicatory authority had that case been filed with the court in the first place. But
the general removal statute certainly does not require use of the federal forum. In contrast, SLUSA's removal provisions work to make
sure the SLUSA preemption decision is determined by the federal
courts. The court is specifically granted authority to make the substantive preemption decision. The court's adjudicatory authority expires
(but is not retroactively destroyed) when it has made this decision: if
the claims are preempted, the court must dismiss;" if the claims are
not preempted, the court must remand. 9
The SLUSA preemption decision is a final decision on the merits
of the preemption question that the federal judiciary is supposed to
answer: if preemption is not found, the case absolutely will proceed (in
state court) and preemption is no longer an issue in a federal forum. If
preemption is accepted, the case is dismissed. Either way, the federal
court was instructed and authorized by the statute to make the call, in
stark contrast to general removals and remands. The one certain thing
in the SLUSA preemption inquiry is that the federal judiciary alone
has the adjudicatory authority (and responsibility) to make that decision. As the Kircher court explained, this decision "implies the presence of jurisdiction."'' ° The district court's answer to a question that
the law requires the court to address cannot destroy the court's obligation or its authority to answer.
Finally, unlike normal remands that generally leave all substantive issues open to litigation in state court, SLUSA preemption decisions- themselves major substantive issues reserved for resolution by
federal courts-will be unreviewable unless federal appellate courts
have jurisdiction over the district court's remand order. SLUSA's primary aim of promoting uniform national standards for securities class
actions will go unserved if remand orders are immune from appeal.
128 15 USC § 77p(b). The Kircher court noted: "Perhaps one could say that jurisdiction
evaporated at that juncture, but that would be tautological. Once a court does all that the statute
authorizes, there is no adjudicatory competence to do more." 373 F3d at 850. See note 81.
129 15 USC § 77p(d)(4). For an example of a situation in which the court may still retain
adjudicatory authority over certain issues relating to removal even after dismissing the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, consider a district court's discretionary authority under
§ 1447(c) over whether to award attorney's fees to the party opposing removal. See, for example,
Martin v Franklin CapitalCorp, 126 S Ct 704, 708 (2005) (holding that "absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal").
130

373 F3d at 850.
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Appellate Review of SLUSA Remands after CAFA

The absence of an express provision in SLUSA granting appellate
jurisdiction.. is hardly dispositive: Congress may well have sidestepped that issue by creating a specific remand provision outside the
scope of § 1447(c). After all, if Congress intended a determination that
state claims were preserved to be tantamount to a determination that
subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, it need not have created a specific remand provision under SLUSA. If Congress intended that such
remands be "for lack of subject matter jurisdiction," then SLUSA's remand provision requiring remand is superfluous, given that § 1447(c)
mandates remand if a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Congressional silence on the appealability of issues related to SLUSA
suggests that courts should apply the general rules that apply to appeals and remands. These general rules include the specific ones allowing review of remands beyond § 1447(c)'s grasp.
C.

Review Will Promote Consistent Application of SLUSA across
Circuit and District Courts

Congress enacted SLUSA with an eye toward "enact[ing] national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally
traded securities.' ' .2 As noted earlier, "district court cases appear to be
all over the map on the issue of what state law claims are preempted
by SLUSA.".... Splits among district courts and different circuits over
which claims are preempted undermine the consistent application of
uniform standards.
Appellate review of remands in cases properly removed under
SLUSA will create uniformity in SLUSA's implementation by providing district courts with clear guiding principles and precedents in this
otherwise barren area of the law. This, in turn, will limit forum shopping and other typical forms of opportunistic behavior that SLUSA
was designed to prevent. Allowing appeals will not create an unnecessary or burdensome increase in appellate court caseloads: the parties
already will have briefed the preemption issue, which will be the primary (and often only) issue before the appellate court.' -4Although this
131 The Second and Ninth circuits make much of this absence, largely pinning their holdings
that SLUSA remands are unreviewable on it. See Spielman, 332 F3d at 127; Abada, 300 F3d at 1119.
132 HR Rep No 105-803 at 2 (cited in note 95).
133 Magyery, 315 F Supp 2d at 959. See note 118 and accompanying text.
134 Notably, there is evidence that, even before SLUSA was enacted, the total number of
securities class actions filed in state courts was relatively low in the context of appellate
caseloads. For example, opponents of SLUSA cited the fact that in the year before Congress
passed the legislation, only forty-four securities class actions were filed in state courts nationwide. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Committee on Commerce Report, Additional Dissenting Views of Congressman Ron Klink, HR Rep 105-640, 105th Cong, 2d
Sess 52 (1998).
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reason by itself is not enough to justify appellate review, SLUSA's
purpose to create uniformity, along with the legal justifications explored above, militate in favor of allowing appellate courts to review
SLUSA remands.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted SLUSA to give the federal judiciary the exclusive authority to decide whether securities class actions filed in state
court alleging fraud in the purchase or sale of nationally traded securities are preempted by federal law. When federal district courts decide
that certain covered class actions, though properly removed, are not
preempted and therefore remand the cases, those courts are exercising
the authority Congress granted them under SLUSA and are not dismissing or remanding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Courts should look to the recently passed Class Action Fairness
Act and its treatment of review of remands to inform their analysis of
congressional intent regarding the nature of remand orders in this
statutory scheme addressing class action abuse. CAFA, passed in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions further delineating the meaning of
the word "jurisdictional," bolsters the position that SLUSA remands
are reviewable because CAFA indicates that remands of this sort are
claim-processing rules rather than rules delineating adjudicatory authority. Appellate review of such orders is consistent with federal law
and would promote SLUSA's goal of uniform standards in securities
class actions without creating costly or unnecessary increases in the
caseloads of federal appellate courts.

